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The Role of Europe in Enhancing Cooperative 
Security in Asia and the Pacific:  A View from Japan  
Takako Ueta 
 
Asia is a prominent export market for 
Europe while in the East and South China 
Seas, tensions continue. Europe has 
searched for its political role in Asia. This 
policy brief presents an analysis and argues 
the role of Europe in enhancing cooperative 
security in Asia and the Pacific, which 
would promote stability and peace there. 
SOURCES OF TENSIONS AND 
INSTABILITY 
Europeans tend to regard Asia as an export 
market. German exports to China have been 
almost half of EU exports. It has been 
profitable and has been indispensable to 
economic growth and the recovery of Europe. 
However, this region has become a source of 
instability and tensions, not only because of the 
longstanding threats which originated from 
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North Korea and potential conflict between 
China and Taiwan, but also because of the 
attitudes by China which has deployed forces 
including maritime safety vessels to its self-
claimed territory in the South and East China 
Seas. 
 
After an academic survey by the UN 
ECAFE had shown the possibility of the 
existence of petroleum resources in the 
surrounding sea of the Senkaku Islands in 
1968, the Government of China and Taiwan 
officially started to make their sovereign 
territorial claims in 1971. Since the collision 
incident between Japanese Coast Guard patrol 
vessels and a Chinese fishing trawler in 
Japanese territorial waters off the Senkaku 
Islands in September 2010, China has 
continuously sent its governmental vessels to 
that area.(2) On December 13, in 2012, an 
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“In principle, I think it would be possible to establish multilateral structures and institutions also in Asia. Of course, 
I realize that there are clear differences between the situation in Europe in the wake of the Second World War and 
the current situation in Asia.… in the 1970s a very particular process was started in Europe called the Helsinki 
Process which was a conference that took place on a regular basis in which European countries on both sides of the 
divided Europe... both sides of the Iron Curtain participated with the aim to promote security-building, confidence-
building, more transparency, better arms control. Why couldn't all this take place in Asia? Of course, it can. It's a 
question of political will. And I think actually that Asia needs more and stronger multilateral structures to deal with 
potential conflicts.”    
 Remarks by NATO Secretary-General Fogh Rasmussen at the National Press Club in Tokyo, April 15, 2013.(1) 
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airplane of the State Oceanic Administration of 
China as well as four vessels entered Japanese 
territorial airspace and sea. On January 30, 
2013, in the East China Sea, a weapons-guiding 
radar was directed from a Chinese State 
Administration aircraft at an escort vessel of 
the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.(3) 
An unpredictable incident may trigger conflict 
as the vessels and aircraft come too close. 
 
It has not been reported in Europe, but in 
Japan this situation is similar to a weather 
forecast or the exchange rate of foreign 
currencies which TV, radio or internet news 
report every hour, day by day. China is not a 
military security threat to Europe, while 
Japanese nationals are very preoccupied about 
their security. Among Europeans, those who 
are mainly concerned about Chinese military 
development are experts on nuclear arms 
control and disarmament. 
 
If the territory under Japanese 
administration is attacked, the US has a legal 
obligation to defend Japan under article five of 
the Japan-US Security Treaty and the Obama 
government has made it clear to China many 
times. On the South China Sea, at the 
Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) in July 2012, Secretary of State, 
Mrs. Clinton, explained the basic US position: 
“the United States has a national interest in the 
freedom of navigation, the maintenance of 
peace and stability, respect for international 
law, and unimpeded lawful commerce in the 
South China Sea…Each of us has followed 
closely the troubling recent developments in 
the South China Sea. None of us can fail to be 
concerned by the increase in tensions, the 
uptick in confrontational rhetoric, and 
disagreements over resource exploitation. We 
have seen worrisome instances of economic 
coercion and the problematic use of military 
and government vessels in connection with 
disputes among fishermen.” In the view of the 
US, not only the South China Sea, but also the 
East China Sea is important. The National 
Defense Authorization Act for the fiscal year 
2013 defines the East China Sea, including the 
Senkaku Islands, as "a vital part of the 
maritime commons of Asia, including critical 
sea lanes of communication and commerce 
that benefit all nations of the Asia-Pacific 
region.”  
 
For Europe, sea lanes of communication to 
Asia as well as freedom of navigation are 
crucial to its economic growth. In order to 
establish an institutionalized risk reduction and 
confidence and security-building mechanism, 
Europe has a role to play.   Europeans seem to 
be concerned about the US “re-balancing” 
toward Asia in military terms. If Asia and the 
Pacific are stable and non-confrontational 
towards US interests, the rebalancing will not 
continue to happen. Not only because of trade, 
do Europeans have every reason to contribute 
to peace and stability in Asia.  
 
Among the Asian countries, Japan’s 
relations with European countries and 
institutions have been distinct.(4) It is far 
beyond cooperative security. Based on the 
same democratic values and on the same level 
of industrialization, their policy lines of various 
issues have been almost the same. In terms of 
defense cooperation, Japan agreed to develop 
military equipment with the UK(5) and 
France(6) on a bilateral basis. In the future, an 
agenda for cooperation could be envisaged 
between Japan and the European Defence 
Agency (EDA).  
 
INTERNATIONALIZATION BY MILITARY 
CONTACTS AND DIALOGUES 
A British think tanker, Mr. Charles Grant 
pointed out the big difference between Russia 
and China: “China does not take global 
governance very seriously on issues of security, 
but it does engage, when it sees an interest in 
doing so, on economic subjects. Russia has 
tended to take the opposite approach: it has 
been willing to sign up to international rules on 
security, but is reluctant to engage in economic 
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global governance… In the field of security, 
China is a rising power, increasingly confident 
in its new found strength. So it is unwilling to 
be shackled by international rules on 
armaments…The rhetoric of China’s leaders 
remains closer to that of the engagers than of 
the nationalists: they talk of multilateralism. But 
they see multilateralism as a tool and a tactic for 
promoting China’s interests, rather than – as 
many Europeans see it – as an inherently 
superior system. China remains reluctant to 
engage in arms control or other sorts of 
security governance.”(7) 
 
The East Asia Strategic Review 2013 which 
was published by the National Institute for 
Defense Studies of Japan referred to the 
importance of cooperation with China as 
follows: cooperation “on the maintenance of 
maritime order through bilateral and 
multilateral frameworks will further improve 
military transparency and the PLA’s manners at 
sea and lead to the inclusion of China in a 
maritime order based on regulations and the 
rule of law.”(8) 
 
In order to avoid unexpected incidents, a 
maritime communication mechanism including: 
  
• mutual confirmation of the communication 
frequencies of ships and aircraft in the area; 
• the creation of a hotline between the two 
countries’ defense departments; and 
• the holding of regular meetings, has not 
been implemented between the two 
countries because China has not responded 
to Japan.(9) 
 
Despite the territorial problem between the 
two countries on the Northern islands (Kurile 
islands), the implementation record of the 
Agreement of Prevention of Incident at Sea 
between Japan and Russia has been good. The 
reason seems to be that the Russian Forces 
have been internationalized by their contacts 
with the West. Members of the Self- Defense 
Forces of Japan point out that they share the 
same professionalism as military men with 
Russian forces. The Soviet and Russian Forces 
have had significant experiences of military 
contacts and dialogues in the Helsinki Process 
including the military CSBMs since 1975, 
implementation of the US-Soviet arms control 
treaties, and after the end of the East West 
confrontation, the implementation of the CFE 
Treaty and its exchanges with NATO. It helped 
enhance internationalization of the Russian 
forces. 
 
European countries and NATO have started 
to invite PLA to their defense colleges and 
NATO Defence College. It will help PLA 
understand international manner and rules. It 
should be beneficial to China in reducing 
incidents and frictions. In the process of the 
transformation of the role of NATO, 
cooperative security has become one of the 
core tasks. Developing military exchanges and 
contact with China would be an important 
future agenda for NATO.  NATO may 
organize a meeting with non-member countries 
with specific issues. In this forum, if Japan, 
China and other countries in Asia and the 
Pacific are invited, it will pave the way to their 
cooperation together.  This may depend on the 
future evolution of NATO-China relations. 
The channel is not only through NATO, but 
also its member countries. As for the OSCE, 
China is not among its Asian Partners for Co-
operation (Japan, ROK, Thailand, Afghanistan 
and Australia). Among the OSCE participating 
countries, Germany should have a role to play 
since traditionally, Germany has attached 
importance to this organization. 
 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF RISK 
REDUCTION MECHANISMS 
For the purpose of risk reduction, the most 
efficient method is to have constant meetings 
without scheduling, which would allow for 
emergency meetings. More basically, in order to 
implement internationally agreed rules, we need 
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an institution. For the purpose of risk reduction, 
not only the role of the secretariat and regular 
meetings are important, but also contacts 
between the delegations in the same town would 
be useful.  
 
In terms of security cooperation, Europe is a 
highly institutionalized region while Asia does 
not have regional security institutions with a 
secretariat and permanent missions of its 
member states.(10) ASEAN has its secretariat 
and missions, but it is not a military security 
organization. The ASEAN Regional Forum is 
supposed to play the role of security cooperation 
and the EU has a full membership. The ARF is 
supported by the unit of the ASEAN Secretariat, 
but there are no permanent missions. In the case 
of cooperation among Japan, ROK and China, 
in Seoul, the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat 
was established in September 2011, but without 
permanent delegations. 
 
In Asia and the Pacific, there are countries 
with different political systems. For these 
characteristics, the CSCE or OSCE would be a 
reference point. The institutionalization of the 
CSCE started in early 1990s. 
 
The ARF has a Foreign Ministerial Meeting 
once a year, and it is supported by senior 
officials and various inter-sessional meetings. 
The separate ADMM plus (Meeting of ASEAN 
Defense Ministers and Defense Ministers of US, 
Japan, Australia, ROK, China, New Zealand, 
India and Russia) is to be convened every other 
year. In the case of the East Asia Summit (EAS), 
it is an annual summit and is prepared by 
Foreign Ministers and senior officials. Every 
time when necessary, meetings need to be 
scheduled. The ARF Foreign Ministerial 
Conferences and the EAS Summits are always 
held in the yearly rotating chair holder country 
of the ASEAN. There were some reasons for 
the lack of the institutionalization of security in 
Asia and the Pacific. During and immediately 
after the Cold War, it was Russia who proposed 
the Asian Collective Security System which was 
not accepted by the US and its allies.  
 
The existing forum for multilateral security 
dialogues such as the ARF has been led by 
ASEAN, which does not like to be dominated 
by an institution, while even security experts 
from ASEAN and other countries admit that 
an ASEAN-centered approach to security is 
not working well(11) in view of the rising 
tensions. The EAS is dealing with every policy 
area including security, but it has also taken an 
ASEAN-centered approach. ASEAN has had 
difficulties in keeping its unity because China 
has divided ASEAN member countries, which 
Europeans experienced in the case of the solar 
panel dispute.  
 
It is crucial to distinguish between the 
support of regional cooperation among 
ASEAN countries, and the deficit of the 
ASEAN-centered approach to security. In 
terms of promoting security cooperation and 
the establishment of an institutionalized 
mechanism in Asia and the Pacific, not only 
NATO and the OSCE, but also the EU has a 
significant role to play. The EU has been a top 
or major trade partner and investor of 
countries in Asia and the Pacific. It has been a 
major donor of development assistance and 
other support activities. In this regard, the EU 
has leverage.  
 
Paragraph 25 of the Revised Guidelines of 
the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East 
Asia, adopted in June 2012 deals with the 
mechanisms: “The EU should share our own 
experience of regional peace and security 
mechanisms (including for example, the 
OSCE), and should be willing to cooperate in 
the context of broader East Asia peace and 
security mechanisms as they evolve.” In EU 
terms, East Asia includes ASEAN countries. 
 
High Representative Baroness Ashton and 
Secretary of State Clinton issued a Joint EU-
US Statement on the Asia-Pacific Region in 
July 2012: “Both sides plan to work with Asian 
 5 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
partners on increasing maritime security based 
on international law as reflected in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and 
lend assistance to the development of 
confidence building measures to reduce the risk 
of clashes and conflict. On the South China Sea, 
both sides continue to encourage ASEAN and 
China to advance a Code of Conduct and to 
resolve territorial and maritime disputes through 
peaceful, diplomatic and cooperative solutions. “ 
 
DESIRED MECHANISM 
In the discussion of designing institutionalized 
risk reduction mechanism, it cannot be 
influenced too much by the CSCE experiences. 
Firstly, in comparison to the Cold War era, 
nowadays, countries with a different political 
and value system are in the globalized economy. 
This means that the three basket approach of 
the CSCE is not relevant. Secondly, in order to 
meet rising tensions, the target should be 
immediate risk reduction and military confidence 
and security-building measures, and not to touch 
upon the human rights issues which would be a 
non-starter in Asia. Thirdly, for obvious reasons, 
the confidence and security-building measures 
should not include exchange of naval military 
information and measures related to movement 
of the navy since the institution without US 
participation does not make sense. Fourthly, it is 
not necessary to negotiate a basic document 
which is comparable to the Helsinki Final Act, 
because the objective is risk reduction and 
respect for the existing internationally agreed 
rules. The negotiation of the basic document 
should cause significant delay.  
 
The desired measures to be introduced would 
be: 
• Communication network which is the same 
as the OSCE and links the member 
countries and organizations; 
• Weekly meeting at Ambassadorial level with 
Military representatives; 
• Emergency meetings by Foreign Ministers; 
• If agreed, this institution supports 
implementation of agreed disarmament 
and non-proliferation treaties, regimes, and 
related United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions. 
 
Geographically, it should cover all Asia and 
the Pacific, and not be limited to North East 
Asia or South East Asia since the nature and 
the root cause of the rising tension is the same. 
North East Asia and South East Asia are sub-
regions and after the establishment of the 
institution, sub-regional measures could be 
introduced.  
 
Regarding North East Asia, President Park 
of South Korea launched the idea of non-
military cooperative measures on the occasion 
of her visit to the US in May 2013. A security 
expert in South Korea explained that the 
objective of this idea was to support the Six 
Party Talks, but it was not agreed by the US 
and China since the priority of the two 
countries was to re-convene the Six Party 
Talks as soon as possible. 
 
In view of the current political climate, it 
would be almost impossible to institutionalize 
the ARF and EAS in this way because of its 
style of decision taking. For this reason, it is 
necessary to set up a separate forum which is 
an assembly of Ambassadors and Military 
representatives of the member countries, and 
meet at least once a week. It needs a small-
scale administrative secretariat, and member 
countries and the EU should set up its mission 
to the forum. The secretariat should be located 
in a capital which has almost all the embassies 
of member countries so that the political 
section of the embassy could be double-hatted 
to this mission in order not to be too costly. 
Another requirement will be that for the 
purpose of emergency meeting at the Foreign 
Ministerial level, easy access of flights from 
other capitals. Freedom of press should be 
necessary for interviewing and reporting the 
activities of the forum. The problem of this 
region is that there has been no neutral 
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country with diplomatic skills and efficient 
conference support which is comparable to e.g. 
Austria, Finland, Sweden or Switzerland. 
 
This institution would not duplicate the work 
of the ARF and EAS. On the contrary, it will 
support these fora at a working level, which 
could be a significant contribution to and 
enhancement of the effectiveness of their work. 
 
FUTURE PERSPECTIVE AND THE ROLE 
OF EUROPE 
On the tensions in the East China Sea, the EU 
declaration in September 2012 is helpful in the 
enhancement of rule of law: “With its significant 
interests in the region, the EU is following with 
concern the developments in East Asia's 
maritime areas. The EU urges all parties 
concerned to seek peaceful and cooperative 
solutions in accordance with international law, in 
particular the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea and to clarify the basis for their claims. The 
EU calls on all parties to take steps to calm the 
situation.” Japan proposed that South Korea 
bring the territorial problem to the International 
Court of Justice three times in the past. South 
Korea has never accepted doing this. In the case 
of China, the former Foreign Minister of Japan 
suggested that China should refer the case to the 
ICJ as China was not satisfied with the status of 
the Senkaku islands. 
 
Because of its specific character, the EU can 
act like a neutral state, although its policies 
remain driven by its values. The EU may point 
out that the activities of China have been 
counter-productive because countries which are 
threatened by China are strengthening their 
alliance and deterrence capabilities. As a result, a 
vicious circle of militarization is in progress, 
which would deprive China of precious 
resources. It should invest in environmental and 
social affairs. Destabilization in the neighboring 
region will not contribute to its economic 
growth.  
 
In the process of drafting the EU Global 
Maritime Security Strategy, the role of the EU 
in Asia and the Pacific is expected to be 
discussed, in particular respect for the rule of 
law, because danger would not be limited to 
this area. If we do not have a responsible 
China but one which would seek a China-
centric order(12), the international rules of 
Western origin will be in crisis. The same thing 
can be said to NATO which is expected to 
have more discussion on the Alliance Maritime 
Strategy. 
 
Another role of Europe in reducing 
tensions in North East Asia is to explain its 
history from a different angle. In the past, 
China and South Korea accepted apologies 
from Japan(13), but they have brought 
historical issues to the fore mainly because of 
their domestic politics. The EU needs to make 
clear that the reconciliation was achieved 
between Germany and France, which share the 
same democratic political system and values. 
Peace in Europe was not accomplished by a 
unilateral apology from Germany, but the role 
of the Schuman Plan from France was 
significant.  
 
In South East Asia, responsible statesmen 
are future-looking and have expressed 
gratitude for development assistance from 
Japan, which was also offered to ROK and 
China. 
 
A Korean Studies expert in Japan, 
Professor Kurata, expressed concern about the 
foreign and security policy of the Park 
Government, which is seeking a balance 
between China and the US. As long as US-
China relations are good, it may work, but 
China has its own strategic interest.(14) The 
press reported that South Korea and China 
agreed on military cooperation in June 2013. If 
this South Korean policy would turn out to be 
based on an illusion, and not realism, the 
policy would be comparable to the policy of 
balance of Poland between the two World 
Wars. It is a question of an assessment of 
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The geo-strategic location of South Korea is 
similar to Finland before the end of the Cold 
War, while Finland was not an ally of the US, 
and did not have a hostile “North Finland.” In 
view of the instability of North Korea, the 
military experts deplore that necessary defense 
cooperation with Japan is not possible because 
of the nationalism of their country.(15) Both 
countries agreed on the General Security of 
Military Information Agreement, but because of 
their nationalism, the Korean Parliament 
postponed the signature in June 2012.(16) 
 
On Japan, in response to tensions, the first 
stage of the foreign and security policy of the 
Abe Government has been focused on the 
strengthening of the alliance with the US and 
developing security cooperation with Australia, 
India, Vietnam, and other countries. Regarding 
the review of the interpretation of the right of 
collective self-defense and the issue of the 
amendment of the Constitution(17), its policy 
objectives are not interpreted as the 
remilitarization of Japan, but seek enhanced 
burden sharing with the US, as well as an 
upgraded contribution to peacekeeping activities. 
When Japan deployed the Self-Defense Forces 
to Iraq in Samawah from 2003 to 2009, its 
missions were strictly limited to water 
purification, medical services, reconstruction of 
public infrastructures, transportation and so on. 
They were protected by the Dutch, UK and 
Australian forces because the SDF were lightly 
armed. 
 
The second stage of the foreign and security 
policy of the Abe Government may need to 
have a vision of a sustainable security network in 
Asia and the Pacific, based on its deeply-rooted 
pacifism since the Pacific War, which would give 
Japan its rightful place and position among its 
neighbors.  
 
Whereas the experiences in Europe are not 
well-known in Japan, a few steps have been 
taken. On July 30, the Defense Minister of 
Japan, Mr. Onodera visited the OSCE 
Secretariat in Vienna. It was the first ever 
ministerial visit of Japan. He expressed his 
opinion that Asia needed to have a framework 
which was comparable to the OSCE with a 
permanent institution and weekly security 
dialogues. On August 29, 2013, in his speech at 
the ADMM plus in Brunei, he referred to his 
visit to the OSCE, and suggested his proposal 
for its heading towards the establishment of a 
permanent institution for the purpose of 
continuous dialogues which should include 
transparency measures of armed forces. In his 
view, these exchanges of views would 
contribute to the enhancement of stability in 
the Asian security environment. He urged that 
the ASEAN should learn from the experiences 
in Europe. Ambassador Iwatani, who was 
bilateral Ambassador to Austria and was 
responsible for the OSCE, was appointed as 
the Secretary-General of the Trilateral 
Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul in September 
2013. Already in summer 2012, a senior 
diplomat, Director-General of the European 
Bureau Mr. Kozuki, contributed a 
commentary, “Why Asia Needs a New 
Security Framework” to Europe’s World .(18) 
 
The former Prime Minister of Australia 
deplored the lack of a diplomatic culture of 
cooperative security in Asia.(19) He was an 
advocate of an OSCE-type institution in Asia. 
On the occasion of the OSCE Foreign 
Ministerial in December 2011 he stated that 
“We’ve been building the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, building the East Asia Summit, 
building APEC and Australia’s longstanding 
diplomatic support over past years for the long 
term emergence of an Asia Pacific community. 
These are important steps in that direction. 
But in the future we perhaps need something 
that is the equivalent of the Helsinki Accords. 
Maybe the Tokyo Accords. Maybe the Jakarta 
Accords. Maybe the Seoul Accords. Maybe 
even the Canberra Accords.” 
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In my view, as stated above, at the first stage, 
it is not necessary to negotiate a basic document. 
It will be a gradual process. It would be easier to 
start this process while we have US President 
Obama, who has been sympathetic to 
multilateral cooperation, and the risk reduction 
mechanism should reduce the US burden. We 
need to seek a win-win solution for peace and 
stability in Asia and the Pacific. The 
institutionalization of risk reduction mechanisms 
and security cooperation is the way to proceed. 
Dr. Takako UETA is professor at  the 
Internat ional  Chris t ian Univers i ty  in 
Japan. She was Ambassador ,  Deputy Chie f  
o f  the Miss ion o f  Japan to the EU (2008-
2011),  advisor and member o f  the 
Delegat ion o f  Japan to major 
CSCE/OSCE meet ings (1992-2001),  and 
Spec ial  Advisor on NATO and European 
secur i ty  to  the Embassy o f  Japan to Belg ium 
(1990-1993).  The views expressed in this  
paper are her own. 
 
 




1. EU Participates in the ARF and ASEAN PMC (Each EU members doesn’t participate in these fora individually).  
2. The name and outline of each forum is as follows:  
(a) ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) Forum for region-wide dialogue concerning political and security-related matters in 
the Asia-Pacific region  
(b) ASEAN PMC (ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences) Forum for dialogue between ASEAN member countries and 
their external dialogue partners at the Foreign Ministers' level  
(c) APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) The premier forum for facilitating economic growth, cooperation, trade 
and investment in the Asia-Pacific region  
(d) EAS (East Asia Summit) Forum led by leaders for developing concrete cooperation to deal with common regional 
issues  
(e) ASEAN Plus 3 (ASEAN Plus Three) Forum for developing concrete cooperation in wide areas among ASEAN 
member countries, Japan, China and Republic of Korea  
(f) ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) An association of 10 Southeast Asian nations for accelerating 
economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region  





(2) According to the Japan Coast Guard, Chinese government ships have entered the Japanese waters over 60 times from 
September 11, 2012 to September 10, 2013, compared with three times during the year before. Chinese ships have spent a 
total of more than 250 days in the contiguous zone just outside the Japanese waters in the past year. Jiji Press, 
(2013/09/10-18:12)  
(3) http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/position_paper3_en.html 
(4) On Japan-EU relations, see Takako UETA, “EU Policy toward Asia and the Pacific: A View from Japan” in: 
International Relations and Security Network (ISN), Center for Security Studies (CSS), September, 2013, ETH, Zurich, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=169796  
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means of settling international disputes. (No proposal to amend this provision.) 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will 
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CHAPTER IX AMENDMENTS, Article 96. Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a 
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for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or 
at such election as the Diet shall specify. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government/frame_01.html 
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